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RECENT DECISION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF FOR-

EIGN VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS PERMISSIBLE IF THE VESSEL IS
SUBJECT TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES LAW, AND EVIDENCE

ACQUIRED IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE EXCLUSION
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Defendant 1 was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana
into the United States. 2 Defendant had boarded the Panamanian
vessel PHGH, which was docked off the coast of Colombia, while

the ship was being loaded with marijuana.3 After the Drug Enforcement Administration observed the loading activity, the
Coast Guard Cutter Acushnet began surveillance of the PHGH.4

When the PHGHwas forced to stop because of mechanical difficulties, crew members attempted to signal the Acushnet.5 After

receiving Panamanian authorization,' an armed party from the
1. Defendant was Frank Gunnar Williams, a United States citizen.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976). This section prohibits conspiracy to import controlled substances barred by 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1976), including marijuana.
3. The PHGHwas a 270-foot cargo vessel of Panamanian registry. The ship
was supposedly en route from Venezuela to Peru with a load of sulphur. United
States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1070 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
4. A routine Drug Enforcement Administration flight to detect possible drug
trafficking spotted the PHGH anchored off the coast of Colombia. The ship was
a rendezvous point for several smaller vessels. The pilot reported his observations to the Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Center. When the
Acushnet sighted the PHGH several days later, the Coast Guard Commander
consulted a master list and identified it as the same vessel which had been observed earlier. Id.
5. The Acushnet approached the PHGH, which had hoisted a distress flag
after generator problems rendered the vessel immobile. Several crew members,
who had acquiesced in the drug transportation only at gunpoint, took advantage
of the ship's difficulties and signalled the Acushnet by waving clothes, toilet
paper and flashlights. One bold crewman dove overboard and swam to the
Acushnet, where he informed the Coast Guard that there was "dirty business"
going on aboard the PHGH. Id.
6. The Panamanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs issued the authorization
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Acushnet boarded the PHGH in international waters.7 Failing to
locate the ship's registration number in the engine room, the
boarding party entered the cargo hold and discovered the contraband.' The Coast Guard then confiscated the vessel and arrested
the defendant, who was later convicted.9 Defendant's conviction
was affirmed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 10

The panel held that the search and seizure on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity did not abridge the fourth amendment."
The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to clarify the
panel's fourth amendment analysis and to harmonize conflicting
Fifth Circuit precedent. 12 Defendant's conviction was affirmed.
Held: The fourth amendment standard for search and seizure at
sea differs from that on land; search and seizure on reasonable
suspicion that a vessel is subject to the operation of United States
law satisfies the fourth amendment, although reasonable suspicion may not be the minimum standard. United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing,617 F.2d
1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees security from an unreasonable search and seizure: a search
conducted without a judicially approved search warrant. 13 Subject
to the Coast Guard through the State Department. Id.
7. At the time of the seizure, the PHGHwas stalled approximately 100 miles
east of the Yucatan Peninsula. Id.
8. The search was made pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976). This statute
authorizes the Coast Guard to stop and board vessels to check registration numbers and safety precautions in order to prevent violations of United States law.
See text accompanying note 19 infra. Upon entering the cargo hold, a Coast
Guardsman noticed paper packages containing a total of 21,680 pounds of marijuana. 617 F.2d 1063, 1071.
9. United States v. Williams, No. 78-28 (S.D. Ala. May 22, 1978).
10. United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. Id. at 214.
12. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).
13. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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to limited exceptions, judicial approval is dependent on a demonstration in front of a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists
before a search warrant is issued.14 This probable cause requirement protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy,
an expectation that the United States Supreme Court has protected from "invasions . . . of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."15 One1 6 "carefully drawn '17 exception to this

guarantee is that administrative inspections authorized by a statute may be reasonable, absent a search warrant.18 The Coast
14. The Supreme Court stated in Katz v. United States that searches conducted without observance of the warrant process are per se unreasonable. 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981)
(opaque containers in automobile discovered incident to arrest could not be
opened without a search warrant); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978)
(homicide committed in home insufficient to justify warrantless search of dwelling); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (warrantless search of home incident to arrest held unconstitutional).
15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3 (1977) (placing personal effects inside locked footlocker
manifests an expectation of privacy; warrantless search of locker in absence of
exigent circumstances unreasonable). See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
16. There are two other exceptions to the general rule. First, a private area
may be searched upon probable cause without a search warrant if the delay in
procuring a warrant might result in loss of the evidence. Such a search is permissible if required by "exigent circumstances," and often has been upheld with
respect to automobiles. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298 (1967) (search of the house permissible without a warrant due to exigencies
of hot pursuit).
Second, a search conducted at a border or its "functional equivalent" is reasonable under the fourth amendment because of the special interest in securing
United States borders. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (customs officials allowed to open envelopes entering the United States from Thailand because of the "longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless 'reasonable' ").
17. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (citing Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).

18. This exception is construed narrowly and invoked under statutes involving closely regulated industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection." Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (sole
penalty against liquor licensee refusing to allow statutorily authorized inspection
was statutory monetary sanction; forcible entry penalty was disallowed); cf.
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health
Act provision allowing warrantless inspections held unconstitutional); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1973) (warrants required for health and safety
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Guard has the authority to pursue warrantless administrative

searches:
The Coast Guard may make... searches... upon the high seas
and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the
prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States. For such purposes,.
officers may at any time go
on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States... and.., search the vessel
19

The inevitable conflict between this broad delegation of authority
and the basic freedom granted by the fourth amendment has gen-

erated inconsistent application of the relevant fourth amendment
standards 20 by the Fifth Circuit, which is the court confronted
inspections of dwellings, although the warrants could issue on something less
than probable cause).
19. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976). This broad power is conferred on the Coast
Guard because shipping has long been closely regulated by the United States
Government. Once a vessel has been properly stopped and boarded for an administrative inspection, see text accompaning notes 22-26 infra, no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists regarding any area of the ship in plain view during
the inspection. Before any private area may be searched, however, a warrant
must be obtained or conditions invoking a separate exception to the general
fourth amendment guarantee of privacy must exist. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 601 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
20. See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra. These inconsistencies, which
are not unexpected when twenty-four judges sit on the same bench, may have
contributed to the recent division of the Fifth Circuit into two new circuits: a
new Fifth Circuit and an Eleventh Circuit. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 852 (1980). Earlier decisions
were problematic because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals blurred the various
exceptions to the search warrant requirement in order to uphold Coast Guard
action under § 89(a). See, e.g., United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1315
n.36 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearingdenied, 601 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
448 U.S. 906 (1980), in which the court stated:
In exploring a possible distinction between inspections and searches, we
should be mindful that, in the maritime context, the policies behind several traditionally discrete exceptions to the warrant requirement--the border search doctrine, the administrative inspection exception for certain
regulated industries, and the automobile-exigent circumstances doctrine-uniquely converge.
595 F.2d at 1315 n.36. The variety of standards which has been articulated by
the court for a legitimate stop of a vessel at sea has led to uncertainty among
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with the majority of the search and seizure at sea appeals.2 1 In
United States v. Odom2 2 the Fifth Circuit held that absent suspi-

cious circumstances the Coast Guard could stop and board a
United States flag vessel in international waters to check the
ship's documents and inspect for safety violations. Documentary
and safety inspections of United States flag vessels in the absence
of suspicion were upheld as constitutional in United States v.
One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel "Wind's Will".2 3 Another Fifth
Circuit case, United States v. Cadena,2 4 extended Odom to inspections of foreign vessels and held that no suspicion was required prior to Coast Guard exercise of its section 89(a) authority
to search foreign vessels on the high seas. The expansion of section 89(a) authority permitting the Coast Guard to stop and
board vessels has been restricted, however, in more recent Fifth
Circuit decisions. In a case involving a customs statute analogous
to section 89(a), United States v. Kleinschmidt,2 5 the Fifth Cirlaw enforcement officials as to what, if any, degree of suspicion is necessary
before they may act under section 89(a). See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
at 1069.
21. Most such search and seizure appeals arise in the Fifth Circuit, which
includes Florida, because of the many overseas drug smuggling efforts in that
area. In the Mexican or Canadian border areas, smuggling attempts are often
made over land or by air. When sea-based cases do arise, other circuits usually
apply long-standing fourth amendment principles to ascertain the validity of ac-

tion by law enforcement officials. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, No. 79-1059
(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1980).
22. 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976). Odom involved a routine boarding in the
Yucatan Straits for a "safety inspection." The inspection ripened into a fullfledged search when burlap bags containing marijuana were found in the hold of
the vessel. Id. at 340-41. See also United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
23. 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
24. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing denied, 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.
1979) (per curiam). In Cadena,the Coast Guard boarded a foreign vessel (it was
not clear from the facts whether the ship was of Canadian or Colombian registry) pursuant to a preplanned "sting" operation.
25. 596 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 599 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1980). Kleinschmidt involved 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a) (1976), which provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel...
within the customs waters.., and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel ... and any
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and
stop such vessel ....
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cuit held that reasonable suspicion was a prerequisite to investigatory stops of United States vessels by customs officials. Simi-

larly, the panel opinion in the instant case required reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity prior to Coast Guard seizure of a
foreign vessel on the high seas.26 The more narrow holdings in

Kleinschmidt and in the instant case are reinforced by decisions
maintaining similar principles involving land-based administra-

tive inspections.
Coast Guard action against foreign vessels on the high seas may
not violate the general principle of free navigation. This guaran-

tee, first articulated by Hugo Grotius, 2s has been incorporated
into subsequent international common law through traditional
custom of the seas 29 and international treaties.30 The United

States Supreme Court also has recognized free navigation. 31 The
concept of free navigation, along with several exceptions, was

eventually codified by the Convention on the High Seas (CHS).32

The Fifth Circuit has ignored the lead of the Supreme Court,

however, and has not respected the limited exceptions to the
principle of free navigation. In Cadena,the Fifth Circuit avoided
recognizing directly that none of the exceptions to the principle of

free navigation applied by holding that the flag state was not entitled to rely on the CHS because the nation was not a signatory
to the treaty.3 3 The Cadena court failed to consider that the

26. United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d at 214.
27. See note 18 supra. Criminal suspicion and arrest are among the exceptional circumstances justifying a warrantless search.
(1916).
THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 60-61 (3d ed. 1959); C.

28.

See R. MAGOFFIN, GROTIUS ON'THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 38

29.

H.

SMITH,

ed. 1967).
See text accompanying note 32 infra.
See, e.g., The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826). Justice

COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 10 (6th

30.
31.

Story stated there that "the ocean... is the common highway of all... and no

one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there." Id. at 41.
See also The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
32. The exceptions, derived from both international custom and convention,
are that a vessel on the high seas may be stopped and boarded for the following
reasons: (1) a state's exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over ships flying the
nation's flag; (2) reasonable suspicion that the vessel is engaged in piracy or
slave trade; (3) self-defense; (4) hot pursuit; (5) acts of interference authorized
by a treaty with the flag state. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, arts. 2, 5, 13-21, 23-25, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
33. 585 F.2d at 1260-61.

RECENT DECISION
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treaty merely codified previously existing international common
law rights. 4 In dictum the court stated that even if the Coast
Guard violated international law, exclusion of evidence so obtained was not necessarily required, because other remedies, such
as damages or dismissal of indictments at the request of the flag
state, were available. 5 This dictum contradicts the Supreme
Court's holding in The CharmingBetsy 8 that an act of Congress
should never be construed "to violate the law of nations, if any
other possible construction remains. ' 37 In United States v. Postal,38 the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a seizure case in
which the flag state, the Grand Cayman Islands, was a signatory
to the CHS. Thus, the seizure constituted a clear breach of both
international custom and convention. The court circumvented the
question by holding that the CHS did not control domestic law
because the treaty was not self-executing.39 The decision in Postal
highlights the conflict between United States and international
law, as well as the conflicts within domestic authority. These conflicts, however, evidence the commitment of the Fifth Circuit to
confront the significant drug enforcement problem by upholding
police action against United States-bound vessels carrying narcotics. The en banc court reheard the instant case to clarify conflicting prior authority, to establish the fourth amendment standard
for search and seizure under section 89(a), and to offer an analysis of the exceptions to the doctrine of freedom of the seas. 40

III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In the instant rehearing, Judge Tjoflat's majority opinion dis-

agreed with the panel's initial application of land-based search
34.

See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.

35. 585 F.2d at 1261.

36. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
37. Id. at 118.
38. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
39. Id. at 876. A self-executing treaty is one which has the force of domestic
law, either because the treaty so states or because of -the circumstances surrounding its adoption. Id. After analyzing the CHS, other treaties to which the

United States was a signatory, and cases liberally construing jurisdiction at sea,
the court concluded that the CHS was not self-executing. Id. at 884. See also
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593
(1927).

40. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1069.
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and seizure standards to searches and seizures at sea.41 To ascertain the proper standard against which to judge the Coast Guard
action, the majority followed the analytical framework established
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ramsey:42 the court
first identified the authorization for the action and next considered the constitutionality of the action.4 s Judge Tjoflat found that
14 U.S.C. section 89(a) authorized the seizure of the PHGH.44 Examining the authorization of that seizure, the court interpreted
section 89(a) to require reasonable suspicion that the PHGH was
subject to United States law before the Coast Guard could prop-.
erly stop and board the vessel.45 Citing Postal, the court found
that the PHGH was subject to the operation of United States law
for the purposes of section 89(a) because those aboard the vessel
were engaged in conspiracy to violate federal narcotics statutes."
Since Ramsey neither requires that the authorization be derived
from the statute in question nor precludes the court from deriving authorization from international law, the court stated in dictum that Panama's consent alone would have provided sufficient
authorization for the seizure.47 The constitutional question
whether the statutorily authorized seizure nevertheless violated
the fourth amendment formed the second focal point for the majority's analysis.48 Judge Tjoflat rejected the panel's conclusion
that suspicion of criminal activity was required before the Coast
Guard might constitutionally stop and board a foreign vessel on
the high seas.49 While admitting that a "minimum standard"
41.

Id. at 1079.

42, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
43. 617 F.2d at 1074. The instant court stated that, although Ramsey was
not automatically applicable because it involved a search on land, the Ramsey
two-part analysis would allow the court to factor out the inapplicable aspects of
land-based fourth amendment analysis. Id. at n.10.
44. The PHGH was "seized" since the stopping and boarding of the vessel
restrained the ship's freedom to proceed. Id. at 1071 n.1.
45. Id. at 1076.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1077. The court suggested that Panama's consent met at least the
first (authorization) step of the Ramsey analysis pursuant to executive authority
over the Coast Guard. Id. Defendant had not challenged this contention.
48. Id. The court cited Cadena for the proposition that the fourth amendment's protections were not limited to United States vessels or citizens. Id. at
1078 n.17; see United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1262. Contra 617 F.2d at
1092 n.7 (Roney, J., specially concurring).
49. Id. at 1078. Judge Tjoflat recited a litany of horrors that would flow from
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could not be formulated in the abstract, the majority explained
that the constitutionality of a seizure could be determined only
through application of the weighing process used in land-based
cases: 50 balancing the governmental interests protected by section
89(a) against the defendant's privacy interests adversely affected
5 1 The court noted that enforcement
by the seizure of the PHGH.
of narcotics laws was of vital importance to the United States and
that the seizure of the PHGHwas a limited and foreseeable intrusion. 2 Thus, seizure of a foreign vessel on the high seas pursuant
to section 89(a) is-not an unreasonable violation of fourth amendment rights.53 After examining the initial boarding of the PHGH,
the court next applied the two-part Ramsey analysis to the search
of the hold that followed the initial seizure.54 The court concluded
that during an inspection authorized under section 89(a) there
could be no reasonable expectation of privacy in any area of the
ship's hold which would be in plain view.5 5 Finally, Judge Tjoflat

application of the panel's "crimirial activity" standard. Id. He stated that such a
requirement would invalidate all customs searches except those based on criminal suspicion, a clearly undesirable result. Id. Indeed, current customs statutes
allow Customs officers to stop and board vessels in territorial waters in the absence of suspicion. See note 25 supra. Judge Tjoflat also cited the cases upholding § 89(a) seizures of United States flag vessels on the high seas absent any
modicum of suspicion. Id. at 1082; see text accompanying note 22 supra. Additionally, under international law vessels in international waters may be stopped

and boarded for several reasons other than suspicion of criminal activity. See
note 32 supra.
50. 617 F.2d at 1083.
51. Id. The court balanced the governmental interest protected against the
private interest affected in order to determine whether the Coast Guard action
was constitutional. Id. This same type of balancing process is used in cases involving searches and seizures on land. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975) (public interest balanced against individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers in order to determine
reasonableness of seizure).
52. Id. The court stated that the seizure was "limited and foreseeable" because a vessel in territorial waters was always subject to customs stops under 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976), and a vessel on the high seas was subject to stops based
on the CHS. Id.; see note 32 supra.
53. Id. at 1084.
54. Id. at 1085. The court found that § 89(a) provided statutory authorization for the search of the PHGH.Id. The court next considered the constitutionality of the action by ascertaining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
had been violated. Id. at 1086.
55. Id. at 1087. Nine of the twelve judges who joined the majority opinion
felt that no such expectation of privacy was possible, but joined this part of the
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discussed the provisions of international law and the effect of
Panama's consent on the propriety of the seizure and concomitant search; he held that the Panamanian Government's consent
to the search operated as a waiver of any rights Panama might
have had under international law. 6 In dictum the court stated
that even if the Coast Guard action had violated the international
legal principle of free navigation, under Postal and Cadena presentation of that evidence would not necessarily be precluded.57
Only twelve of the twenty-three judges rehearing the instant
case joined Judge Tjoflat's opinion. 8 In a concurring opinion, 59
Judge Rubin questioned whether the defendant had standing00
and added that muddled precedent did not justify the majority's
creation of judicial legislation. Judge Rubin felt that there had
been no violation of the fourth amendment because the Coast
Guard action was authorized by section 89(a), and that Panama's
consent foreclosed any questions of international law."" Judge Roney also filed an opinion" in which he specially concurred in the
result but disagreed with the majority's analysis.6 3 Although Panama's consent had foreclosed arguments that international law
had been violated, Judge Roney explained that international law
authorized the seizure" and that the limits on the instant action
must be derived from international law, rather than the fourth

opinion in order to achieve a majority. Id. at 1087 n.25.
56. Id. at 1090.
57. Id.; see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 884; United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1261. The instant court relied on these cases for the conclusion that other remedies, such as damages or dismissal of indictments at the
request of the flag state, were available. Thus, exclusion of the evidence was not
required. 617 F.2d at 1090. See also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 611 (2d ed. 1976).

58. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Judge Coleman and Judges
Brown, Ainsworth, Gee, Tjoflat, Vance, Garza, Henderson, Reavley, Politz,
Hatchett and Sam D. Johnson. 617 F.2d at 1063-64, 1069.
59. Judge Rubin's opinion was joined by Judges Kravtich, Randall, and
Frank M. Johnson, Jr. Id. at 1093.
60. Id. Judge Rubin felt that it was doubtful that the defendant had standing to contest the search of the PHGHbecause he had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the hold of the vessel. Id.
61. Id. at n.1.
62. Id. at 1090. Judge Roney's opinion was joined by Judges Godbold, Hill,
Fay, Tate and Thomas A. Clark. Id.
63. Id.
64. 617 F.2d at 1091 n.6. Judge Roney stated generally that exceptions to the
principle of free accessibility do exist. Id.

RECENT DECISION
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amendment.65
IV.

COMMENT

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the instant opportunity to write an essay on the law of search and seizure on
the high seas. Applying Ramsey, the majority found authority for
the Coast Guard action, either under section 89(a) or through the
consent of the Panamanian Government.6 Although both conclusions are open to dispute, 7 the major question arises from the
court's analysis of the constitutionality of the Coast Guard action.
While a firm resolution of the confusion engendered by previous
conflicting Fifth Circuit decisions is certainly desirable,68 the instant court's resolution fails to provide necessary analytical clarity. Judge Tjoflat concluded that the fourth amendment should
be applied less rigorously when the action in question occurs at
sea rather than on land,6 and he delineated the search and
seizure standard to be used for actions occurring at sea.70 This
attempt is analytically inconsistent. On one hand the court applied Ramsey's two-part analysis utilizing a balancing test de-

rived from land-based search and seizure law; on the other hand,

65. Id. at 1091. Judge Roney concluded that the fourth amendment did not
apply to foreign vessels on the high seas. Id..He further criticized the majority's
application of the fourth amendment because the cases cited did not support the
majority's analysis. Id. at 1092. Judge Roney felt, however, that defendant's status as a United States citizen entitled him to fourth amendment protection. He
did not find any violation of defendant's rights in the instant case. Id. at 1093.
Judge Anderson also filed a short concurring opinion approving of the result,
but he stated that the majority had been overly expansive. Id. at 1099-1100. He
limited his analysis to a finding that § 89(a) authorized the seizure and that
probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the search. Id.
66. See text accompanying notes 47 and 56 supra.
67. It has been suggested that the broad grant of authority given the Coast
Guard under § 89(a) unconstitutionally abridges the fourth amendment search
warrant requirement. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1973). Further, the court's acceptance
of Panama's informal permission as satisfying the treaty exception to the freedom of the seas doctrine might be questioned by those who would require a
formal, written treaty between the states involved. See 617 F.2d at 1090.
68. See note 20 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 41 & 52 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 50 supra. The majority has rejected reasonable suspicion, substituted a nebulous balancing test, and allowed the government to meet the new test merely because law enforcement at sea is difficult.
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the court substituted a more lenient test for the constitutionality
of searches and seizures at sea.71 Even if the majority is correct in
applying Ramsey to the instant search and seizure, the inevitable
balancing of interests should comport with established constitutional standards and should not be altered simply because law
enforcement at sea is difficult. Although the majority's effort to
articulate a fourth amendment criterion specific to search and
seizure at sea is understandable in light of the difficulties of drug
enforcement activities, it is unnecessary. This decision might have
been based on narrower grounds. The separate opinions joined by
eleven of the twenty-three judges, concurring in the result but
dissenting from the majority's analysis, 2 indicate that the court
easily could have upheld the instant action under well-established
"land-based" principles. The administrative inspection or probable cause and exigent circumstances exceptions to the search warrant requirement would legitimate the Coast Guard's action.7 8
The treaty exception to the principle of free navigation, whether
evidenced by formal or informal consent, would provide interna-

tional legal justification for searches of foreign vessels on the high
seas.7 4 Thus, the instant action could have been upheld under established principles of both domestic and international law. Nevertheless, the majority has broadly concluded that :the instant
search and seizure were permissible since the PHGH was subject
to the operation of United States law.75 The court's holding will
provide law enforcement officials with authority to stop and
board United States flag vessels at any time.76 Foreign vessels will
be subject to search and seizure in United States territorial wa71. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
73. Section 89(a) gave statutory authority for the instant search and seizure.
See text accompanying note 19 supra. The observations by the Drug Enforcement Administration pilot and the actions of the PHGHcrew members provided
probable cause that United States law was being violated. The ship's mobility (it
was possible that the generator problem could have been corrected) provided
exigent circumstances. 617 F.2d at 1077.
74. See note 32 supra.
75. 617 F.2d at 1075.
76. American flag vessels in United States territorial waters are subject to
customs inspections under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). See note 24 supra. On the
high seas, United States flag vessels are always subject to administrative inspec-

tions under § 89(a), because a vessel is at all times subject to the jurisdiction of
the flag state. See note 35 supra.
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ters," and also in international waters if there is reasonable suspicion that a vessel is involved in conspiracy to violate United
States law.7 8 Additionally, dicta in the instant opinion indicates
that the CHS "treaty" exception to free navigation may be invoked by informal consent from the flag state.7 9 Additional signif-

icant dicta suggests that a violation of international law will not
be determinative in considering whether evidence must be excluded. 0 Although the instant opinion grants liberal power to law

enforcement officials, it provides little coherent guidance for
judges on the recurring question of Coast Guard authority vis-avis drug smugglers. The court rejected "reasonable suspicion" as a
standard by which to measure Coast Guard action," but it offered
no viable alternative. Since the court applied a balancing test
rather than a minimum standard, future Fifth Circuit holdings
using the instant decision as precedent will be ad hoc rulings on
the validity of Coast Guard action, determined according to the
court's general sense of whether the relevant governmental interest outweighs violations of private rights. These individualized
judgments will create a patchwork of conflicting decisions, because different courts have varying thresholds for invalidating
governmental action. Since the Supreme Court has refused to
grant certiorari to provide more guidance in this area, ad hoc
decision-making continues to present especially confusing
standards.
Duane A. Wilson

77. Section 1581(a) extends to both foreign and domestic vessels. See note 24
supra.

78. 617 F.2d at 1077.
79.
80.

Id. at 1090.
Id.

81. Id. at 1078.

